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Do Corporate Taxes harm economic performance? 
Explaining distortions in R&D- and Export-Intensive UK Firms * 
 
Ioannis Bournakis1 and Sushanta Mallick2 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper makes a first attempt to analyse the effects of corporate tax liability on firm 
level Total Factor Productivity (TFP) – as the key driver of economic performance. This is a 
new dimension in the UK productivity puzzle that has not attracted attention so far.  We use 
6559 manufacturing firms over 2004-2011 to investigate whether higher levels of corporate 
tax affect the productivity catch-up process by reducing after tax earnings that can be 
alternatively used for productivity enhancing investment. We particularly focus on R&D and 
export intensive firms. Our key results are summarized as: first, higher levels of corporate 
taxation impact adversely on TFP and this finding is robust to different tax measures and 
insensitive to endogeneity bias; second, R&D and export intensive firms tend to have higher 
rates of TFP growth; finally, higher levels of tax liability as a share of Earnings Before 
Interest and Tax (EBIT) decelerate TFP growth of these firms.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The persistent losses in UK productivity since 2007 indicate that understanding the 
productivity puzzle requires a combination of factors -other than pure cyclical effects- such 
as: investment in intangible capital formation (Goodridge et al., 2013), impaired resource 
allocation (Oulton, 2001) and Barnett et al. 2014) and factors proportion (Harris and Moffat, 
2016). In this paper we seek to explain this puzzle by investigating any possible unintended 
effects on productivity arising from higher levels of corporate tax during the 2000s. In 
particular, our analysis uses firm level data to explore how corporate tax liability affects 
productivity performance within a firm-level productivity convergence framework.  
There is a strand of literature that stresses the role of taxes on various aspects of firm 
performance. Hall and Van Reenen (2000) argue that there is an equal and proportionate 
relationship between tax exemptions and R&D investment that largely determine the location 
of R&D activity. Djankov et al. (2010) have found in a cross-country context how different 
types of corporate taxation affect FDI and industry dynamics focusing on firms’ entry and 
exit decisions. With the exception of Arnold et al. (2011), evidence on the effect of corporate 
tax on productivity is scarce. The empirical evidence from Arnold et al. (2011) indicates that 
higher corporate tax negatively affects productivity growth in more profitable industries. The 
present study is motivated from findings of the above studies in order to investigate whether 
changes in corporate taxation can have effects on productivity performance of R&D and 
exporting firms. Our motivation to investigate the effects of corporate taxation across firms 
with different R&D and export status relying on corporate finance models (see Keuschnigg 
and Ribi, 2013) and Brekke et al., 2014) that show how tax liability can impact on investment 
decisions of firms which are financially constrained. This literature argues that external 
creditors face asymmetric information when they decide their allocation of funds across 
firms; so any firm liability that reduces the amount of profit potentially limits the amount of 
external credit. R&D and exporting firms are heavily dependent on external funding; thus one 
should identify whether there are tax-induced effects that adversely impact on these 
activities.3  
                                                            
3 The focus on R&D and exporting in this study represents the weight of these activities on aggregate 
productivity. It is now a well-established stylized fact with regard to the existence of social returns to innovation 
(see Griffith et al. (2003, 2004), Cameron (2006), Bourlès et al. (2013) and Bloom et al. (2013) on the role of 
R&D in productivity catch-up models). Similarly, there is substantial literature (less conclusive though) about 
the existence of learning effects from exporting. We refer to Melitz (2003) for a theoretical exposition while 
more recent evidence for the learning by exporting literature can be found in Mallick and Yang (2013). 
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In this context, our paper contributes to the firm productivity literature investigating the 
existence of fiscal effects that might matter for the rate of productivity growth at the firm 
level. More precisely, we address two questions: (i) whether changes in the statutory 
corporate tax rates affect investment decisions in productivity enhancing projects and (ii) 
whether tax effects vary for R&D and exporting firms. A novel aspect of our paper is that we 
do not rely only on how exogenous statutory corporate tax rates affect productivity but we 
also use firm specific payments of corporate tax to capture all the within-firm manipulations 
realised when firms comply with tax legislation.    
Two main stylized facts justify why evidence from UK firms is well suited to this sort of 
analysis. First, in recent decades, productivity levels in the UK have substantially fallen 
behind those of the US (Cameron et al., 2005; Mayhew et al., 2006) while there is also 
evidence of within industry productivity dispersion (Griffith et al. 2006). Therefore, it 
becomes important to identify whether there are fiscal aspects of this productivity handicap. 
Second, the existence of considerable firm-level heterogeneity (Davis et al., 1996; 
Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Disney et al., 2003) both across and within industries suggests 
that UK firms are quite likely to react differently to external shocks, which in turn affect both 
firms’ rate of productivity growth and the speed of convergence towards the national frontier. 
Understanding how firms respond to changes in tax policy is vital from a macroeconomic 
perspective when policy makers make choices between different types of taxation and their 
potential impact on firm-level productivity growth. The empirical part of the paper builds 
upon recent theoretical model (Keuschnigg and Ribi (2013)) that highlights the importance of 
post-tax income as an asset for external funding. The theoretical prediction of this model is 
that higher levels of corporate tax negatively affect investment decisions and thus 
productivity growth. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 overviews key aspects of 
the taxation-productivity nexus; section 3 presents the empirical strategy alongside data and 
key features of the UK corporate tax system; section 4 presents the econometric specification 
and results from baseline and sensitivity analysis; and section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. Analytical Underpinnings for the Taxation-Productivity Link 
Corporate finance models (Hubbard (1998), Cullen and Gordon (2007) and Keuschnigg 
and Ribi (2013)) that analyze how taxation policy can affect investment motivate the 
empirical framework of the paper.  These models propose that corporate tax increases the 
user cost of capital, and also identify mechanisms through which taxation worsens financial 
constraints due to moral hazard and asymmetric information between external creditors and 
the firm. We assume that investment decisions are sensitive to external finance and hence 
higher levels of corporate tax liability decrease the amount of post-tax working capital that 
firms can use as collateral for raising external funds. This leads to financial constraints that 
potentially decrease investment in activities which can promote technical efficiency.4 We 
analyze the adverse tax induced effects on a firm’s performance within a productivity 
convergence framework in the spirit of Aghion and Howitt (1998) allowing for corporate tax 
liability to drive both firm productivity growth and the catch up process towards the frontier.  
Corporate taxation can cause disproportionate effects on R&D and exporting firms as 
these two groups are relatively more sensitive to external finance. The key objective 
investigated in the present paper is whether changes in tax policy affect productivity 
performance of more risk-taking firms. R&D activity is very likely to incur losses in the 
short-run5 as it involves substantial start-up costs that are to a large extent sunk. These costs 
are paid up-front, which require sufficient cash-flows that are usually derived from external 
sources. Furthermore, one should not ignore that R&D projects are highly uncertain addingto 
R&D firms’ extra liquidity pressure, which is again covered from external finance (Máñez et 
al., 2014). In a neoclassical set-up (Hubbard, 1998) with perfect information, taxation affects 
investment only via an increase in the user cost of capital which is the opportunity cost 
associated with the alternative uses of firm’s income. The model of Keuschnigg and Ribi 
(2013) proposes another view in which firms operate in an environment of tight credit 
constraints and imperfect information between the firm and its creditor. Based on these 
considerations, higher corporate tax lowers the amount of post-tax income and it shrinks the 
borrowing capacity of the firm. The main implication of this theoretical proposition is that 
                                                            
4 Gemmell et al. (2016) show that negative effects induced from higher corporation tax is proportionally 
higher to small firms. This effect is attributed to the fact that small firms are more likely to be credit constrained 
in the post-tax period, which also affects their capacity to raise external funding. See Schaller (1993) and 
Aghion et al. (2007) for an exposition on how asset size influences external finance. 
5 These losses prevail up to the point that current projects become fertile leading to the appropriation of 
economic rents (i.e. revenue from patents). 
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R&D firms encounter difficulties to finance future innovation projects, which in turn lead to 
efficiency losses and lower productivity growth. The key element tested in this paper is 
whether higher average tax expenses lead to adverse effects on the financial position and 
borrowing capacity of R&D firms. 
Changes in the corporate tax can also impact firms’ commitments in serving international 
markets. Exporting involves relatively higher levels of business costs,6 which require 
additional financial strength. The corporate tax system can create incentives or disincentives 
for exporters in a similar fashion as it is with R&D firms. A higher corporate liability reduces 
firm’s working capital as well as it deteriorates chances for external finance. Likewise with 
R&D firms, the paper investigates whether higher levels of corporate taxation affect 
investment, which can lower productivity growth and restrict the international commitment of 
UK exporters.7  
To sum up the previous considerations, we investigate the distortionary effects of taxation 
on firm productivity within a convergence framework. The empirical evidence of the paper is 
taken from FAME data of UK manufacturing firms for the period 2004-2011. For the 
implementation of the empirical analysis, a well-specified TFP measure is required. We use 
the semi-parametric approach of Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP, hereafter) to derive TFP that 
addresses, first, simultaneity bias between inputs and various unobserved productivity shocks 
and second, selection bias. 8 OP offers more flexibility than standard OLS and purely non-
parametric TFP technique relying on a set of strong assumptions.9 We outline the OP 
methodology and the issues related to FAME data in Appendix 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
6 Costs related to exporting are the establishment of foreign networks, transportation of commodities, post 
sales services etc. 
7 Exporting activity can generate substantial learning gains (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Greenaway and 
Kneller, 2004; Greenaway and Yu, 2004; Crespi et al., 2008), and thus any obstacle to international expansion 
can potentially restrict knowledge spillovers related to exporting. 
8 For a robustness check, we also calculate TFP using the semi-parametric technique of Levinsohn-Petrin 
(LP) (2003). The econometric results from TFP via LP (2003) are discussed at the end of the econometric 
analysis section. 
9 See Blundell and Bond (2000) and Hígon (2004) for an analytical discussion regarding alternative 
parametric estimation techniques for TFP. OP’s advantage is that it controls for selection bias between capital 
and probability to exit the market. Firms with higher level of capital stock are likely to generate more future 
profits and thus the probability to exit after a negative productivity shock is smaller. 
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3. Empirical Strategy 
3.1. Model Specification 
  
The empirical model is derived from an autoregressive specification of productivity as 
per Bernard and Jones (1996a and 1996b) and Griffith et al. (2009) formulation. Parameter A 
is the measure of technical efficiency, which is assumed to be homogenous of degree 1 and 
exhibit decreasing returns with reference to each individual production input. Vector itγ  
includes other firm specific characteristics that literature suggests (Aw et al., 2008) as crucial 
determinants in the evolution of A. The empirical variant of A is a TFP index: 
 1 1 2 3 1ln ln ln lnit it it Ft Ft itA a A a A a A u− −= + + + +γ   [3.1] 
 
Equation [3.1] can be empirically reformulated into an Error Correction Model (ECM) 
specifying TFP growth in firm i as: 
 2 3 1 4 5
1
ln lnit Ft it i i
it t j it
TFP a TFP a Tax a R a E
GAP S u
−
−
∆ = ∆ + + + +
+ + ϒ + +λ δ η
  [3.2] 
 
ΔlnTFPF is the growth rate of the frontier F, Tax refers to the tax measure (corporate tax 
liability or effective tax rate (ETR)), R and E are binary variables referring to the R&D and 
Export status of the firm, (R=1, if i is an R&D active firm during the whole period of our 
sample and 0 otherwise; a similar definition applies to E). 1itGAP − represents the TFP distance 
between firm i and the frontier firm F, 1 1it FtTFP TFP− −/ . Our benchmark frontier measure is 
the firm with the highest TFP in industry j at year t. 10 The specification is also augmented 
with a set of year (ϒ ) and four-digit NACE (Rev2) sectors ( S ) dummies to capture common 
macroeconomic shocks and fixed idiosyncrasies at the industry level. Finally, there is a 
stochastic error term itu .  
                                                            
10 We replicate results measuring the frontier unit as the firm with the highest TFP in the whole sample at 
year t and as a hypothetical firm with TFP at the average TFP of the 5% more productive firms in industry j in 
year t. Appendix 4 shows summary statistics for alternative definitions of GAP. Indicatively, average firm’s TFP 
is 68.6% of the frontier’s TFP; in other words, the distance from the frontier is 32 percentage points (1-
0.68=0.32). The alternative definitions of the frontier unit provide- as expected- different coefficients for GAP 
and ln FtTFP∆ in [3.2] and [3.3], but the pattern of results and the level of significance remain unchanged. These 
results are available from the authors upon request. 
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 A variant of [3.2] is also considered for testing whether the effect of corporate tax on 
TFP growth varies with firm i’s distance from the frontier using an interaction term of GAP 
and Tax. 
 
2 3 1 4 5 1
1 1
ln ln
[ ]
it Ft it i i it
it it t j it
TFP a TFP a Tax a R a E GAP
GAP Tax S u
− −
− −
∆ = ∆ + + + + +
+ × + ϒ + +
λ
µ δ η  [3.3] 
Parameterµ captures the effect of corporate tax on the catch-up process. Accordingly, we 
posit a positive sign for the estimated coefficient of µ . We also anticipate that estimated 
parameters 2a , 4a  and 5a will be positive while parameters 3a and λ  will be negative. Finally 
we consider another variant of [3.2] that uses interchangeably the interaction terms of 
1[ ]i itR Tax −×  and 1[ ]i itE Tax −×   in order to test whether the effect of tax liability varies with 
the R&D and export status of the firm.  
 We use two alternative definitions of Tax seeking to capture two different 
conceptualisations regarding the impact of tax burden. The first measure is the amount of tax 
bill that is due using the statutory tax rate that applies for each different profit category. 
Based on this, corporate tax liability (Tax) is defined as follows:
5
1
it it s ts
s
Tax EBIT h
=
= − ×∑ τ( ) , 
where EBIT are earnings before interest and taxes as reported in FAME, h is the size range 
(threshold) in which the statutory tax rate changes and τ is the statutory tax rate applied for 
the size range hs in year t. Taxit is expressed as a ratio of taxable profit11 to obtain the share of 
tax liability. The statutory tax rate τ might not change much over time for some group of 
firms but for small and very large sized firms there have been substantial changes in the 
period studied. The second tax measure is ETR expressed as the ratio of corporate tax 
payment over EBIT using only the information available from FAME. ETR takes into 
account all the ex post within business manipulations that firms do before paying the final tax 
bill. Appendix 1A outlines some key characteristics of the UK corporate system in the period 
under review.   
Regarding the definitions of R and E, we only include committed R&D and exporting 
firms implying that R and E are assigned value 1 only if i reports data on R&D expenditure 
and export sales for all eight years of the period 2004-2011.12 Based on this definition, the 
                                                            
11 Taxable profit is reported in FAME under the name Profits before Tax (PbT). 
12 A less strict definition of R and E is also applied assigning value one to firms with R&D and export data 
for at least four years in the sample.  Econometric results from alternative measures of R and E are not shown in 
the paper but they are available from the authors upon request. 
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number of R&D firms is 945 while the number of exporting firms is 1773. Some preliminary 
evidence in Figures 1 and 2 show that R&D and exporting firms clearly maintain a higher 
level of TFP than other counterparts, which gives a signal that the levels of profitability are 
also likely to be higher, thus the issue worth exploring is whether the distortionary effect of 
corporate taxation is more severe in these group of firms.  
To estimate [3.2] and [3.3] we use FAME database that covers both private and public 
companies in the UK. Our sample is an unbalanced panel of manufacturing firms (4-digit 
NACE Rev.2 classification) over the period 2004 to 2011. All data reported in FAME are 
from unconsolidated accounts derived from Profit-Loss and Balance sheets. We focus on 
variables that are needed for the computation of TFP; output is measured as total sales 
adjusted for the cost of materials and firm inventories. Book values from FAME are 
converted into 2005 constant prices using 4-digit NACE industry production price indices 
(Office of National Statistics-ONS). Capital is measured from the book value of total fixed 
assets in FAME after being converted into 2005 constant prices with an industry invariant 
capital price index from ONS. Labour is measured as the number of employees. Appendix 2A 
outlines the key steps for the derivation of TFP following the Olley and Pakes (1996) 
algorithm and Appendix 2B displays summary statistics of all variables used in the analysis. 
 
 
Figure 1: Average TFP Levels of R&D and Non-R&D Firms, UK Firms 2004-2011
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Figure 2: Average TFP Levels of Exporters and Non-Exporters, UK Firms 2004-
2011 
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3.2 Baseline OLS Estimates 
We start with OLS baseline estimates for [3.2] and [3.3], which are shown in Table 1. 
The coefficient of GAPit-1 is negative and highly significant, which is in line with the 
hypothesis that laggard firms tend to grow faster. R&D active firms experience higher TFP 
growth rates while productivity growth differences between exporters and non-exporters are 
insignificant in conventional statistical terms. The autonomous effect of TFP growth of the 
frontier is positive signifying the existence of knowledge spillovers derived from more 
productive firms in the industry. The magnitude of this effect is strong suggesting that 1% 
increase in the TFP growth of the frontier increases TFP growth rate in i by 0.21 percentage 
points. The effect of corporate tax liability (Taxit-1) on TFP growth is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Column (2) replicates results from specification [3.3], 
which augments the original productivity model with the interaction term 1 1[ ]it itGAP Tax− −× . 
The positive coefficient of the multiplicative term suggests that as tax liability increases the 
rate of productivity catch-up falls, which is compatible to our first hypothesis that corporate 
taxation restrains resources whose alternative use is in productivity enhancing investments.  
The role of corporate tax in driving productivity growth of innovators and exporters is 
examined in columns (3) and (4) with the interaction terms 1[ ]i itR Tax −×  and 1[ ]i itE Tax −× . 
Coefficients of the multiplicative variables are negative and significant suggesting that the 
burden of corporate tax causes adverse productivity effects in those two groups. A further 
investigation is undertaken with a triple interaction term to test whether innovators and 
exporters grow faster compared to non-innovators and non-exporters, conditional on the 
distance from the frontier and the level of tax liability. Results are shown in columns (5) and 
(6) signifying that innovators and exporters typically maintain higher absorptive capacity 
closing the productivity gap faster with the speed of this process to depend on the level of 
corporate tax liability.  
OLS estimates for [3.2] and [3.3] are supportive of the initial hypotheses that higher tax 
liability reduces the amount of working capital weakening a firm’s position to invest in 
productivity enhancement assets13 and the distortive effect of corporate tax is 
disproportionately higher on firms that invest in R&D and export activities. Firms that 
undertake efficiency enhancing activities such as innovation and international market 
expansion encounter various uncertainties that require higher levels of working capital as a 
                                                            
13It will also be valid to point out here that firm i’s opportunity cost of higher tax liability is less market 
expansion highlighting the alternative uses of existing working capital. 
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counterweight for likely short-term losses. Working capital is the main collateral that firms 
can use for obtaining external funding and continue business activities. The use of triple 
interaction terms [GAPit-1×Taxit-1×Ri] and [GAPit-1×Taxit-1×Ei] support a similar scenario; the 
distortive effect of taxation harms disproportionately the catch up process of dynamic firms, 
which might induce uncompensated international competitiveness losses for UK innovators 
and exporters. Finally, the diagnostic tests at the bottom of Table 1 report low R-squared 
values reflecting omitted variables bias. This is to say that there are other equally important 
TFP growth drivers that are currently excluded from the specifications. Some robustness tests 
are provided in the following sections to prove whether OLS estimates are robust or results 
are driven by potential endogeneity and measurement bias between TFP growth and GAPit-1.  
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Table 1: OLS Regressions of TFP Growth and Tax Liability by UK Firms during 
2004-2011 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ΔlnTFPFt 0.216*** 0.264*** 0.189*** 0.182*** 0.219*** 0.227*** 
 (14.29) (10.86) (13.82) (13.22) (14.23) (13.71) 
GAPit-1 -0.189*** -0.261*** -0.136*** -0.135*** -0.191*** -0.197*** 
 (14.49) (8.55) (12.30) (12.17) (14.38) (13.85) 
Taxit-1 -0.069*** -0.359*** -0.097*** -0.062*** -0.074*** -0.102*** 
 (6.09) (3.65) (6.66) (3.67) (6.12) (4.87) 
[GAPit-1× Taxit-1]  0.435***     
  (3.09)     
Ri 0.005* 0.005* 0.012** 0.004 0.004 0.005* 
 (1.79) (1.69) (2.15) (1.36) (0.70) (1.75) 
Ei 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.011*** 0.001 0.007 
 (0.35) (0.36) (0.70) (3.54) (0.36) (1.55) 
[Ri ×Taxit-1]   -0.053*    
   (1.71)    
[Ei ×Taxit-1]    -0.063***   
    (4.10)   
[GAPit-1×Taxit-1×Ri]     0.075*  
     (1.88)  
[GAPit-1×Taxit-1×Ei]      0.071** 
      (2.07) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 32178 32178 26861 26861 32178 32178 
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.024 0.017 0.017 0.023 0.023 
AIC -25806 -25830 -25779 -25793 -25807 -25809 
RESET 126.750 147.274 25.043 20.915 127.204 130.464 
RESET p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses are consistent robust standard errors clustered by firm and 
*indicates p< 0.10, **indicates p< 0.05, ***indicates p< 0.01. RESET test refers to the hypothesis 
that the model has no omitted variables. AIC is the Akaike information criterion. In relative terms the 
preferred model is the one that minimizes the AIC value. 
 
 
 
3.3 GMM Estimates for Endogeneity and Measurement Bias 
 
The GAPit-1 term in specifications [3.2] and [3.3] comprises the levels of TFPit-1, which 
is also a component of TFP growth rate. Concerning Tax and ETR which enter the 
regressions in lags, they only satisfy weak exogeneity. The tax and TFP relationship might 
have been persistent, as previous TFP realizations impact on future tax liabilities. These 
considerations imply that OLS estimates suffer from endogeneity bias. Another crucial issue 
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in estimating [3.2] and [3.3] is the impact of “noisy” TFP measure, which is a common 
characteristic in firm level studies.14 To provide a more systematic treatment of endogeneity 
and measurement bias, we replicate results of Table 1 using a Generalized Methods of 
Moments (GMM) estimator. The challenging task about GMM estimation is to identify 
appropriately endogenous variables; this is to find valid instruments for Taxit-1, ETRit-1 and 
GAPit-1 that will be uncorrelated with the error term in the TFP growth. In our case, industry 
averages could be valid instruments since errors that are largely idiosyncratic to the firm are 
very unlikely to be correlated to industry average values (Fisman and Svensson, 2007). We 
select values in period t-1 up to t-3 of the following industry (4-digit NACE Rev2) average 
variables: profit rate, equity and TFP15. We use the orthogonality condition test (Sargan 
statistic) 0|i iE Z u  =  , where Z is the set of instruments and the Anderson LM statistic of 
under-identification, 0[ , ]iCov Z Tax ≠ . The Anderson LM statistic tests the hypothesis 
whether the excluded instruments are weak; so they are appropriately excluded from the 
regression.  
Instrument diagnostic tests support our identification strategy with Sargan test being 
unable to reject the null while LM test clearly rejects the null that excluded instruments are 
relevant. Turning to GMM estimates, Tax maintains a negative coefficient in four out of six 
models shown in Table 2 while estimates for the interaction terms between Tax, R and E are 
also negative in columns (3) and (4). The remaining coefficients remain qualitatively similar 
to OLS estimates in Table 1, and exceptionally the triple interaction terms are now 
statistically not different from zero. GMM estimates confirm that a higher level of tax 
liability has a distortionary nature on productivity growth and it affects the catch up process 
of firms towards the frontier; these negative effects prevail even after controlling for 
endogeneity and any other unobserved measurement bias.  
 
 
 
                                                            
14The OP framework used for the TFP calculation accounts for endogeneity bias between the selection of 
inputs and output, although a series of other issues still remain unresolved regarding the degree of capital 
utilization and firm’s monopolistic power in the market. Capital might not always be under full utilization 
introducing short term rigidities that can cause efficiency losses without necessarily reflecting technical 
changes. Similarly, the OP methodology does not capture imperfect competition that leads to economies of scale 
and can be mistakenly attributed to technological progress. 
15 Instruments are computed as mean values across firms in 4-digit NACE Rev2 industries in year t.  Profit 
rate is defined as ooperational profit over total sales industry; equity is defined as: (Total Assets–Long Term 
Liabilities)/Total Assets (FAME). 
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Table 2: GMM Regressions with Industry Level Instruments for TFP Growth and 
Tax Liability of UK Firms during 2004-2011 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ΔlnTFPFt 3.959*** 3.858*** 3.906*** 3.908*** 3.578*** 3.645*** 
 (7.83) (7.61) (7.32) (7.35) (7.02) (7.54) 
GAPit-1 -0.01*** -0.013*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.015*** -0.014*** 
 (6.53) (6.31) (6.13) (6.15) (6.09) (6.34) 
Taxit-1 -0.122*** -0.175** -0.355 -0.357 -0.204* -0.187** 
 (3.51) (2.14) (1.40) (1.49) (1.66) (2.02) 
[GAPit-1× Taxit-1]  -1.170     
  (0.91)     
Ri 0.294*** 0.288*** 3.627*** 0.304*** 2.044 0.289*** 
 (6.31) (5.90) (4.02) (5.97) (1.07) (5.79) 
Ei 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.081*** 0.635*** 0.073*** 0.356 
 (5.57) (5.32) (5.31) (4.11) (5.19) (1.30) 
[Ri ×Taxit-1]   -16.228***    
   (3.81)    
[Ei ×Taxit-1]    -2.703***   
    (3.79)   
[GAPit-1×Taxit-1×Ri]     -11.895  
     (0.94)  
[GAPit-1×Taxit-1×Ei]      -2.006 
      (1.04) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 32390 32137 32136 32136 32137 32137 
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 
Anderson LM 52.077 37.236 47.361 48.325 18.597 41.507 
Anderson-p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000 
Sargan 7.083 0.306 10.216 10.852 5.843 5.859 
Sargan-p value 0.528 0.989 0.333 0.286 0.558 0.556 
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses calculated consistently for robust standard errors clustered by firm 
and *indicates p< 0.10, **indicates p< 0.05, ***indicates p< 0.01. The instruments in all 
specifications are the average values of profit rate, equity and TFP at the NACE Rev 2 industry level 
in periods t-1, t-2 and t-3. The Sargan test refers to the orthogonality condition; under the null the 
instruments used are valid (i.e. uncorrelated with the error term. The Anderson LM test refers to the 
relevance of instruments with the endogenous variable; under the null the set of instruments used is 
weak.  
 
3.4 Further Sensitivity Tests with Alternative Measures of Corporate Taxation 
The results shown in Tables 1 and 2 refer to a tax measure that represents what the firm 
is supposed to pay on different ranges of income assuming that it complies with all rules and 
laws. In other words, Tax measures what is due to the tax office without capturing firm’s 
efforts and facilities to shift or reduce the amount of tax bill based on the pre-tax profits. One 
can argue that the “true” effect of taxation on TFP is captured only via the actual tax amount 
paid, which is measured with a variable of effective tax rate (ETR).  ETR is essentially a firm 
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specific variable; so there are severe causal effects with TFP. To interpret correctly the ETR-
TFP growth relationship, we only focus on GMM estimates for [3.2] and [3.3]. Instrument 
identification tests at the bottom of Table 3 show evidence concerning the relevance of 
industry level averages namely industry profit, equity and TFP as instruments. 
 Using ETR as a tax variable produces very similar results with Taxit-1 in Table 2. The 
associated interaction terms of ETRit-1 with GAPit-1, Ri and Ei are statistically insignificant. 
Finally, we find again that R&D and export active firms tend to have higher rates of TFP 
growth. Nonetheless, Table 3 shows neither evidence that ETR affects differently the groups 
of R&D and exporting firms nor their convergence towards the frontier. Results in Table 3 
indicate that the distortionary character of corporate tax on productivity is existent for all 
firms (not only for the more dynamic ones) and this mechanism takes place via lowering the 
levels of investment in projects that can boost productivity.  
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Table 3: GMM Regressions with Industry Level Instruments for TFP Growth and 
ETR (UK Firms during 2004-2011) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ΔlnTFPFt 2.162*** 1.400** 1.389** 1.397** 1.373** 1.394** 
 (2.79) (2.22) (2.16) (2.18) (2.14) (2.17) 
GAPit-1 -0.063*** -0.182** -0.183** -0.18** -0.187* -0.181** 
 (2.66) (2.00) (1.97) (2.00) (1.94) (1.98) 
ETRit-1 -0.101 -0.217** -0.235** -0.216** -0.235** -0.215** 
 (0.78) (2.15) (2.23) (2.13) (2.24) (2.12) 
[GAPit-1× ETRit-1]  -0.076     
  (0.56)     
Ri 0.172** 0.100* 0.195 0.100* 0.192 0.101* 
 (2.53) (1.81) (1.26) (1.79) (1.42) (1.80) 
Ei 0.045** 0.023 0.024 0.035* 0.024 0.033* 
 (2.35) (1.48) (1.59) (1.66) (1.57) (1.75) 
[Ri ×Taxit-1]   -0.968    
   (0.57)    
[Ei ×Taxit-1]    -0.086   
    (0.51)   
[GAPit-1×Taxit-1×Ri]     -1.322  
     (0.64)  
[GAPit-1×Taxit-1×Ei]      -0.110 
      (0.51) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 29624 28516 28516 28516 28516 28516 
Adjusted R2 -2.225 -0.834 -0.884 -0.833 -0.877 -0.835 
Anderson LM 12.849 12.720 13.008 12.847 12.968 12.537 
Anderson-p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan 6.856 4.203 4.069 4.253 4.005 4.250 
Sargan-p value 0.144 0.649 0.667 0.643 0.676 0.643 
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses calculated consistently for robust standard errors clustered by 
firm and *indicates p< 0.10, **indicates p< 0.05, ***indicates p< 0.01. The instruments in all 
specifications are the average values of profit rate, equity and TFP at the NACE Rev 2 industry level 
in periods t-1, t-2 and t-3. The Sargan test refers to the orthogonality condition; under the null the 
instruments used are valid (i.e. uncorrelated with the error term. The Anderson LM test refers to the 
relevance of instruments with the endogenous variable; under the null the set of instruments used is 
weak.  
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A further test for the robustness of estimates in Table 3 is to use another measure for 
capturing firm i’s manipulations to gain tax reliefs. To do so, we define
it t itTax ASTR ETR∆ = − , where ASTR (average statutory tax rate) is the mean τ across profit 
categories in year t. Given that the ASTR is constant for all firms in year t we anticipate that 
the larger the difference between the two, the stronger the incentive to invest, thus the faster 
the rate of TFP growth. Estimates in Table 4 confirm this proposition with the coefficient of 
itTax∆  to be positive and statistically significant both in OLS and GMM specifications. We 
conclude from these results that the higher the divergence of effective tax rate from the 
average statutory tax, the faster the growth rate of productivity and the speed of convergence. 
We remain agnostic about the real sources driving the differences between ETR and ASTR as 
we have no information about the tax position of the firm (i.e. whether a firm belongs to a 
particular tax group relief), but we view this finding as evidence that any tax manipulation in 
the accounting books that results in less tax burden incentivizes productivity enhancing 
investments.  
Finally, we also estimate [3.2] and [3.3] applying the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) non-
parametric technique for the calculation of TFP. Results from Levinsohn-Petrin algorithm are 
shown in Appendix 3. Our results remain robust with regard to the distortionary effect of tax 
liability and its associated effect on the catch-up process of laggard firms. Overall, we can 
say that the negative effect of corporate tax liability on TFP growth is robust to: endogeneity 
bias, alternative definitions of corporate tax burden and alternative TFP estimation 
techniques. Table 5 summarizes the empirical findings of the study.  
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Table 4: Regressions of TFP Growth and the Difference between ASTR and ETR 
(UK Firms over 2004-2011) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS GMM GMM 
ΔlnTFPFt 0.176*** 0.170*** 0.157*** 0.152*** 
 (12.15) (11.68) (9.27) (6.82) 
GAPit-1 -0.145*** -0.137*** -0.124*** -0.119*** 
 (12.31) (11.25) (8.32) (6.20) 
ΔTaxit-1 0.029*** 0.047*** 0.075*** 0.213* 
 (3.41) (4.41) (3.07) (1.78) 
[GAPit-1× ΔTaxit-1]  -0.047***  -0.145** 
  (3.23)  (2.51) 
Ri 0.006** 0.006** 0.003 0.003 
 (2.37) (2.36) (0.89) (0.80) 
Ei 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 
 (0.23) (0.35) (1.63) (1.51) 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22517 22390 12491 12462 
Number of Firms 4090 4090 4090 4090 
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.017 0.007 -0.012 
Anderson LM   10.992 8.832 
Anderson-p value   0.01 0.03 
Sargan   0.293 0.000 
Sargan-p value   0.864 0.994 
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses calculated consistently for robust standard errors clustered by 
firm and *indicates p< 0.10, **indicates p< 0.05, ***indicates p< 0.01. ΔTaxit-1 is the difference 
between ASTRt and ETRi,t. The instruments in the GMM specifications are profit rate, equity and TFP 
at the NACE Rev 2 industry level in periods t-1, t-2 and t-3.  
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Table 5: Robustness in Statistical Significance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
Olley-Pakes 
ΔlnTFPFt √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
GAPit-1 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Taxit-1 √ √ √ √ √ χ √ χ √ √ √ √ 
ETRit-1 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
ΔTaxit-1 √ √ √ ◊         
[GAPit-1× Taxit-1]   √ χ         
[GAPit-1× ETRit-1]   √ χ         
Ri ◊ √ ◊ √ √ √ χ √ χ √ ◊ √ 
Ei χ √ χ √ χ √ √ √ χ √ χ √ 
[Ri ×Taxit-1]     ◊ χ       
[Ei ×Taxit-1]       √ χ     
[GAPit-1×Taxit-1×Ri]        ◊ χ   
[GAPit-1×Taxit-1×Ri]           √ χ 
Levisohn-Petrin 
ΔlnTFPFt  √    √  √  √  √ 
GAPit-1  √    √  √  √  √ 
Taxit-1  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
[GAPit-1× Taxit-1]    √         
Ri  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Ei  √  √  √  ◊  √  χ 
[Ri ×Taxit-1]      √       
[Ei ×Taxit-1]        ◊     
[GAPit-1×Taxit-1×Ri]         χ   
[GAPit-1×Taxit-1×Ri]            χ 
Notes: Symbols in the Table summarize results across specifications for different estimators and 
different techniques in the calculation of TFP. Symbols denote the statistical significance of the 
estimated coefficients as follows:  √ at 5% and above; ◊ at 10%; χ lower than 10%. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper utilizes firm-level data to investigate the impact of corporate taxation on 
productivity performance in the UK. We analyze the effects of corporate tax liability and 
effective tax rate within a framework of firm productivity catch-up contributing to the limited 
body of micro-evidence in the tax-productivity domain. Evidence shown in the paper 
suggests that higher rates of corporate taxation slow down the rate of TFP growth. There are 
two explanations for this result; the first one can be found within the neoclassical argument 
concerning the alternative use of resources, that is higher taxation reduces the resources that 
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can be alternatively used for capital investment. The second one relies on recent theoretical 
models of asymmetric information between the lender and the firm and the role of after-tax 
income in the distributions of external funds. Based on this, increased tax liabilities decrease 
liquid assets, which decrease the amount of income that firms can promise as collateral for 
gaining external finance. Our results partly confirm that there are asymmetries in this result 
with reference to R&D and exporting firms. Using the tax variable as a measure of tax 
liability, we found that a higher level of tax burden affects disproportionately R&D based 
firms and exporters. This result points to the direction that higher corporate tax can also affect 
the positive spillovers derived from the activities of R&D and exporting firms. This scenario 
becomes less convincing when we apply the effective tax rate as a tax variable as most 
interaction terms found to be statistically insignificant. 
Based on the main message of the present study that national fiscal policy drives firm- 
specific investment decisions and their productivity catch-up process, the main policy 
implication is that we need a tax system that promotes dynamic activities. A progressive 
corporate tax system seems to work towards this direction as it accommodates “a carry 
forward loss” facility, which is vital to firms that engage in activities with high degree of 
uncertainty. Finally, a system of tax exemptions would also have been useful for exporting 
firms that need financial strength before exploiting gains from foreign market expansion.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1:  Measurement of Corporate Tax  
Appendix 1A: Corporation Tax System in the UK  
The UK corporation tax system underwent some important changes in the starting tax 
rate over the period 2001-2011. Table 1A below reports the schedule of corporation tax rate 
in the UK over the 2000-2011 period (Devereux and Loretz, 2011).  
 
UK Statutory Corporate Tax Rate (τ) for Different Profit Categories  
Taxable profit  2000/01-
2001/02 
2002/03 - 
2005/06 
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 -
2010/11 
0 to 10,000 10% 0% 19% 20% 21% 
10,001 to 50,000 22.5% 23.75% 19% 20% 21% 
50,001 to 300,000 20% 19% 19% 20% 21% 
300,000 to 1,500,000 32.5% 32.75% 32.75% 32.5% 29.75% 
More than 1,500,001 30% 30% 30% 30% 28% 
 
Another critical change was implemented in July 2009 when overseas dividend income 
has been largely exempt from UK corporation tax. The tax regime until then was that foreign 
source dividend income was taxable in the UK with a tax credit for foreign corporation tax 
paid abroad. Typically, UK raises substantial revenue from corporation tax as a share of 
GDP, which is higher relative to other G7. However, the burden of tax payments across firms 
is highly uneven, with 80% of total revenue to come from only 1% of the firms.  
  Another issue with the calculation of Tax and ETR is that they become undefined if 
firms report zero profits (EBIT). In the current data set, there are about 16952 observations 
with zero or negative EBIT values. Similarly, there are firms in FAME that report negative 
corporate tax payment for specific years. Firms usually report negative tax for loss carrying 
purposes or to benefit from group reliefs. For the purposes of our analysis, a negative ETR is 
meaningless if any of the two (corporate tax or EBIT) is negative. Therefore, we are forced to 
drop observations with either negative corporate tax or negative EBIT. Finally, our ETR 
measure is more backward looking as it uses the amount of corporate tax paid in year t on 
projects undertaken in any past history whose returns and profits are reported in year t. 
nevertheless our ETR measure is preferred to a more forward looking Devereux and Griffith 
(1999, 2003) for its simplicity and transparency. This is to say that ETR captures more 
adequately what a profit maximizing entrepreneur considers when making investment 
decisions. Appendix 1B shows sample means for ETR and Tax. Both measures follow a 
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similar trend over time but-as expected- ETR is on average 4 percentage points smaller than 
Tax, highlighting within business manipulations for paying lower corporate tax.     
  
 
Appendix 1B: Corporate Tax Liability versus Effective Tax Rate (ETR) 
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Appendix 2:  Data Features and Productivity Computation 
 Appendix 2A: The Olley and Pakes TFP Algorithm 
 
The logarithmic form of a standard Cobb-Douglas production function for firm i is 
written as:   
   0it it it it ity a k lα β ω ε= + + + +      [A2.1] 
   
Where k  and l  are capital stock and labour while ω  is an unobserved idiosyncratic term 
that drives firm i’s individual decisions and ε  is an i.i.d error terms common to all firms (i.e. 
common changes in input prices, other macroeconomic shocks etc.). Estimating parameters  
α  and β  using OLS is problematic due to selection bias between unobserved productivity 
shocks itω  and inputs k  and l  in period t. Olley and Pakes (1996) suggest an estimation of 
[A2.1] in three stages. In the first stage, firm decides the amount of investment (I) and labour 
to be used in the production. Investment is a function of k  and ω , ( , )it itI I kω= . The inverse 
function of investment is monotonic, thus ω  can be written as: ( , )it it ith k I=ω . Substituting 
the productivity function into [A2.1], we get the following: 
 
 0 ( , )it it it it it ity a k l h k I= + + + +α β ε      [A2.2] 
 
In the first stage, a partial linear estimation is used to obtain an estimate for β . For the 
second stage ω  is assumed to follow a first order Markov process:
[ ]1 1| ( )it it it it it itω ω ω ν θ ω ν− −= Ε + = +  with ν  to be a productivity shock term. The Markov-
process is plugged into [A2.1] and it is further considered that production of firm i at year t is 
conditional on a survival probability. Therefore, the conditional form of the production 
function is written as: 
 
  
 1 0 1
0 1
[ | ,x=1] ( , )
ˆ                            ( , ( , ))
it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it
y a k l
a k l h k I
− −
−
Ε = + + + + +
= + + + + +
ω α β θ ω ω ν ε
α β θ ω ν ε
  [A2.3] 
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where x =1 if the firm survives at the end of period t. The estimation of the survival 
probability is implemented at the second stage and unobserved parameter itω is approximated 
by first stage’s estimate of the inverse investment function. Equation [A2.3] is estimated with 
a linear probit and the probability of surviving in period t is called Pt. In the third stage, the 
coefficient of k  is recovered using a non-linear least squares (NLLS) estimator for the 
following specification: 
 10 1ˆ ˆ( , )ˆ t it it itit it it it Py l a k kθ φ ν εβ α α− −− + +− = + +   [A2.4] 
 
with 1 0 1 1 1ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ( , )t it it ita k h k I− − − −= + +φ α .  
 To implement the Olley and Pakes algorithm (1996), we use a balanced set from 
FAME of 13062 firms for each year. We had to drop observations with either missing or 
negative values for y and I. The latter variable is derived from the perpetual inventory 
method: 1 (1 )it it itI k k+= − −δ , where k is the real value of fixed assets reported in FAME and 
δ is the rate of physical depreciation taken at the level of 20%. To obtain I values for 2011, 
we use linear extrapolation to generate the value of fixed assets for 2012. We also use linear 
interpolation when FAME reports missing values for the number of employees. The final data 
set was an unbalanced panel of 6559 firms on average for the period 2004-2011. 
 
Table 2B: Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TFP-Olley and Pakes 52471 5.448 0.924 0.104 10.936 
TFP-Levinsohn and Petrin 47416 1.63 0.189 -7.013 6.427 
GAP 52471 0.686 0.137 0.010 1.000 
Tax 65106 0.162 0.081 0.000 0.210 
ETR 70279 0.126 0.144 0.000 0.467 
ΔTax 56176 0.080 0.145 -0.254 0.245 
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Appendix 3: GMM Regressions of TFP Growth and Tax Liability with Levinsohn-
Petrin (LP) (UK Firms over 2004-2011) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ΔlnTFPFt 0.252*** 0.155* 0.211*** 0.190*** 0.242*** 0.242*** 
 (10.27) (1.67) (7.44) (3.94) (9.45) (8.64) 
GAPit-1 -0.171*** -0.487 -0.171*** -0.171*** -0.187*** -0.185*** 
 (5.99) (1.60) (6.02) (6.00) (7.46) (7.49) 
ETRit-1 -1.444*** -0.972** -1.244*** -1.144*** -1.416*** -1.420*** 
 (11.82) (2.11) (8.81) (4.85) (11.20) (10.84) 
[GAPit-1× ETRit-1]  1.545**     
  (2.01)     
Ri 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.191*** 0.011*** 0.034** 0.011*** 
 (4.86) (4.90) (3.62) (4.87) (2.14) (4.88) 
Ei 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.091* 0.004** 0.011 
 (2.37) (2.37) (2.38) (1.65) (2.50) (1.04) 
[Ri ×Taxit-1]   -0.881***    
   (3.40)    
[Ei ×Taxit-1]    -0.423*   
    (1.68)   
[GAPit-1×Taxit-1×Ri]     0.345  
     (1.34)  
[GAPit-1×Taxit-1×Ei]      0.102 
      (0.64) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24568 24568 24568 24568 24568 24568 
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.040 0.041 
Number of Firms 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 6026 
Anderson LM 25.932 25.531 25.152 26.017 24.924 26.009 
Anderson-pvalue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan 0.98 0.700 0.918 0.695 0.106 0.899 
p value 0.559 0. 893 0.18 0.560 0.264 0.692 
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses calculated consistently for robust standard errors clustered by 
firm and *indicates p< 0.10, **indicates p< 0.05, ***indicates p< 0.01. The table replicates results 
from Table 2 using Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) approach. The key difference between OP and LP is that 
the latter uses intermediate inputs as a proxy for unobservable productivity shocks. The reasoning 
behind this is that intermediate inputs perform better than investment in external shocks hence using 
them can provide more consistent TFP estimates. The instruments in all specifications are the average 
values of profit rate, equity and TFP at the NACE Rev 2 industry level in periods t-1, t-2 and t-3. The 
Sargan test refers to the orthogonality condition; under the null the instruments used are valid (i.e. 
uncorrelated with the error term. The Anderson LM test refers to the relevance of instruments with the 
endogenous variable; under the null the set of instruments used is weak.  
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Appendix 4: GAP Industry and GAP National Frontier Values 
Year GAPIndustry GAPNational GAP 95% Percentile 
2004 69.04% 51.17% 77.85% 
2005 68.92% 51.50% 77.95% 
2006 69.00% 51.49% 78.10% 
2007 68.93% 51.25% 78.31% 
2008 68.92% 50.89% 78.45% 
2009 68.38% 49.78% 79.22% 
2010 68.18% 49.99% 79.36% 
2011 68.28% 50.26% 79.52% 
Average 68.65% 50.68% 78.70% 
Notes: GAP Industry takes as frontier the firm with the highest TFP in the industry in year t, GAP National 
takes as frontier the firm with the highest TFP in the whole sample in year t and GAP 95% percentile takes as 
frontier a hypothetical firm with the average TFP of the five more productive firms in the industry in year t.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
